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Abstract This article explores the reasons for the introduction of anticorruption
agencies of a specific type in Eastern Europe. It is argued that one of the important
functions of these agencies—which are stronger on information gathering,
coordination and strategy rather than on investigation of concrete cases—is to give
to the government some leverage over the anticorruption discourse. Presenting the
anticorruption commissions and agencies as (discourse-controlling) instruments
gives an answer to the troubling question why governing parties are at all interested
in the introduction of such bodies. Apart from instrumentalization in political
discourse, anticorruption bodies in Eastern Europe have had other effects as well. As
shown in the Baltic case, institutional engineering provides for a brief window of
opportunity during which political forces committed to integrity could gain the upper
hand. The problem in Eastern Europe, however, is not the lack of such windows of
opportunities—it is more the lack of really committed political forces capable of
continuous and consistent anticorruption effort.
The problem in abstract terms
Normally the introduction of new institutions should aim to maximize the benefits
and minimize the costs of governance for the public. Yet often it is virtually
impossible to measure the concrete costs and benefits of institutional performance
either because specific institutions cannot be meaningfully discussed in isolation
from the rest of the government, or because they deal with complex and multifaceted
problems. In such circumstances, new institutions are adopted primarily as an
expression of specific societal values and beliefs. Thus, their introduction represents
a constructivist leap of faith: policy-makers create them to demonstrate their own
endorsement of and commitment to specific values. The hope is that the introduction
of a new institution will inspire both citizens and the state officials to observe these
values in everyday life.
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The setting up of anticorruption institutions—agencies, commissions, monitoring
groups, etc.—is the primary example of the constructivist strategy presented above.
This is so due to the following two reasons. First, the value of anticorruption is
undisputed. Moreover, the belief that corruption is the main problem of governance—
graver than unemployment, poverty and poor public services—has become firmly
established over the last 10 years in many countries in the world, and specifically in
Eastern and Central Europe.
Secondly, it is virtually impossible to measure concretely the costs and benefits of
the introduction of an anticorruption agency. The problem is twofold. At a rather
superficial level, there are no universally shared standards and indicators of
performance regarding such anticorruption agencies.1 This problem was well
illustrated in the EU accession process in Eastern Europe by the monitoring reports
(accession and post-accession) of the European Commission. In this monitoring
exercise, standards and criteria were separately negotiated between Brussels and the
different governments of the accession countries.2 This context-sensitive style made
it virtually impossible to pass rigorous comparative evaluations (a fact which has
hardly deterred anyone in making such evaluative judgements).
At a deeper level, the performance of anticorruption institutions is practically
impossible to measure since there is no reliable measurement of corruption—the very
phenomenon they aim to reduce.3 In general, the concept of corruption has become an
umbrella term: it captures—apart from quid-pro-quo illicit transactions—diverse public
frustrations with inefficiencies, substantive injustices, and unfairness of governmental
activities. All these problems are usually lumped together as “corruption” problems. In
this way, the “corruption discourse” has become one of the primary vehicles of social
criticism in contemporary society, which is hardly a surprise in a political context, in
which the grand ideologies of the Left and the Right are passé [4].
Thus, the introduction of anticorruption institutions has become an example of
constructivist logic in institutional engineering. These institutions are created not
because of concrete cost-benefits analyses, but largely because of public pressure on
governments keen on demonstrating their personal integrity, and their commitment
to anticorruption.
Some East European illustrations
Eastern Europe has proven a particularly useful laboratory for different institutional
experiments over the last 20 years. In the anticorruption field the region boasts a
wide spectrum of anticorruption bodies. At the ends of this spectrum we find two
1 Generally, indicators of performance do not travel well across borders: sentences for corruption related
crimes, indictments, prosecutorial checks, proceedings against high-standing officials, corruption
prevention, policy-input in institutional reforms, civic education, raising public awareness and others
have been used as standards for the evaluation of anticorruption efforts without there being any universal
template for assessing the relative weight and importance of each of those.
3 Perception-based indicators suffer from well known weaknesses: they reflect general public
dissatisfaction with the government and are strongly affected by recent public scandals. Proxy measures,
such as victimology studies, provide narrow and specific angles to the phenomenon of corruption: for
instance, they reduce it to the practice of specific forms of bribery in a given society. See [6]
2 For the context-dependence of EU conditionality [8]
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types of rather different institutions. Firstly, there are the Baltic anticorruption
agencies (in Lithuania4 and Latvia5 in particular) which combine prosecutorial,
investigative, preventive and educational prerogatives. These agencies resemble very
much the Hong Kong and the New South Wales famous anticorruption bodies. The
resemblance is both in terms of powers and relative independence from the
government. At the other end of the spectrum we find institutions with preventive
and coordinative functions, whose prerogatives are limited to the creation of
anticorruption strategies and plans, the monitoring of the implementation of these
plans, advice to the government, etc. Such bodies became very popular in South East
Europe in the period 2000–2004: for instance, in Albania, there was the so-called
Anticorruption Monitoring Group, in Macedonia—the State Commission against
Corruption; similar commissions were created in Bulgaria, in Bosnia and other
countries as well [10]. In between these two extremes there is a variety of institutions
which combine in different proportion investigative, preventive, educational and
coordinative functions. Countries do experiment with the possible models: for instance,
after trying the “preventive and coordinative” model Bulgaria set up in 2008 a special
agency with some limited investigative powers to target high level corruption and
involvement in organised crime (State Agency for National Security—SANS).
If one ventures generalizations it needs to be said that the Baltic model of
independent multi-task agencies is more the exception rather than the rule in the
region. Some countries, like Croatia, Romania and Moldova have chosen a hybrid
version: they have set up specialised anticorruption law enforcement units, having
significant investigative and prosecutorial prerogatives. The most numerous group of
countries, however, have opted for something closer to the “preventive and
coordinative” model, and here we can put Macedonia, Serbia, Armenia, Slovenia,
Bulgaria (until 2008), Hungary and others.
As it was already mentioned, there are no reliable comparative evaluations of the
performance of these institutions. A recent paper has argued that “ [p]rogress in
fighting corruption in Central and Eastern Europe remains scarce, notwithstanding
the establishment of a significant number of new institutions devoted to the cause
anti-corruption, and the investment of considerable resources and expertise.” After
this rather gloomy conclusion the paper continues to argue that “…it appears from
the experience so far that independent, multi-task ACAs of the kind established in
Latvia and Lithuania have a better chance to represent a solid anchor for meaningful
anti-corruption activities and may be better able to withstand the inherent political
pressure”. The authors also argue that “…in a situation where a culture of corruption
is present in the public sector…a new, independent multi-task agency appears to
stand a better chance of having a fresh start” [1].
It is rather premature to grant the “Baltic model” any form of superiority in the
fight against corruption, however. For all we know, the Baltic agencies have indeed
stood up to senior politicians and in at least one case have helped to oust a
government, as with the resignation of Prime Minister Aigars Kalvitis. But in many
countries in the region governments, PMs, and ministers have lost their office due to
corruption allegations even without the help of anticorruption agencies. To take an
4 Lithuanian Special Investigative Service (STT).
5 Corruption Prevention and Combating Bureau (KNAB).
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example from Bulgaria, in the last two parliamentary elections governmental parties
have lost mostly because losing the anticorruption pre-election debate: thus, in 2001
the ex-tsar Simeon’s party won a landslide election against the government of Ivan
Kostov, perceived as corrupt by the public; in 2005, the tsarist party was itself
defeated in elections mostly because of similar corruption allegations. If anti-
corruption agencies just help to oust governments faster, is this their real added
value? Do they help the democratic process in this way? Do they represent some
form of a substitute for the democratic process?
No one has systematically studied the impact of anticorruption bodies on the
democratic process in Eastern European countries. In the name of objectivity, the
most it can be said is that the introduction of anticorruption bodies has sometimes
helped to break up conservative, inefficient and authoritarian structures of the state
machinery, and to introduce a greater degree of separation of powers in law
enforcement—an area where the communist legacy of hierarchy and centralism is
still felt. Thus, in the Bulgarian case, the introduction of SANS in 2008 helped break
up the special services of the largely unreformed Ministry of Interior and diminished
dramatically the powers of its head by strengthening the powers of the Prime
Minister. Yet, this initial positive result was quickly overshadowed by a string of
subsequent scandals in which SANS got entangled, including an attempt to use
surveilance instruments against a large section of the Bulgarian media. In January
2009, a senior representative of the European Commission summed up the situation
in a revealing way: “...the introduction of SANS was a positive step...Now we
expect it to start work [3].”
The politics of anticorruption
The fight against political corruption is a matter of politics. Over the last 10 years an
impression was created that this fight could somehow be reduced to the adoption of
a set of institutional reforms, and the introduction of certain administrative bodies.
Not surprisingly no one is today particularly thrilled with the results of this strategy.
Governments in Eastern Europe have entered a competition for proving their
personal integrity and commitment to anticorruption through institutional reforms.
Thus, countries like Bulgaria and Romania have sophisticated institutional integrity
systems, including laws on political money, public procurement, anticorruption
bodies, etc.6 Despite all this, there is a growing sense of frustration both by the
citizens of these countries, and their European partners, who have started to demand
“concrete results”. What are these results supposed to be, however? Isn’t this a
euphemism for a demand to replace certain representatives of the current political
establishment, whom the public suspects of tacit links with corrupt and criminal
circles? Ultimately, the constructivist strategy of the elites—proving commitment to
integrity through institutional engineering—has failed in a number of countries in
the region. The local elites are increasingly seen as hypocritical, confidence in them
is very low, and there are waves of populist newcomers vowing to carry out a “new
6 For a review of the general sophistication of the anticorruption institutional framework of the Eastern
European countries see [2]
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revolution”, create a “new republic”, start the transition again, etc. As a result,
Eastern Europe has become the stage for the demagoguery of politicians such as the
Kaczynski brothers, Fico, Orban, Basescu, Siderov, Borissov and others: all of those
instrumentalize the anticorruption discourse mostly in order to gain power [7].
Generally, the traditional liberal democratic political parties in Eastern Europe are
in a precarious situation: their resources for political mobilisation are running out.
Political actors—be they in government or in the opposition—need to make use of
the anticorruption discourse as a means of mobilising electoral support. The problem
for governmental parties is that “corruption” is generally an opposition topic.
Traditionally governments have been on the receiving end, denying corruption
allegations and attempting to dismiss all accusations unless proven in court.
However, governments, sticking only to such a narrow and legalistic conception of
corruption,—crimes proven in court—could hardly use the corruption discourse for
mobilizational purposes. On the contrary, such governments risk to see virtually
everybody talking against them—the media, the NGOs, the businesses, eventually
the prosecutors and the police, if they enjoy a degree of autonomy. Governments,
therefore, need to reexamine their discourse on corruption very carefully, if they do
not want to be left in isolation. In order to break up their discourse isolation,
however, governments must take at least some of the following steps:
First they must publicly admit and recognize the problem of corruption. In this
way they throw a discourse bridge to potential partners in other groups, who are not
directly interested in political changes like the opposition, and build partnerships
with them around specific anticorruption measures
With regard to civil society, in exchange for the public recognition of corruption,
governments could require cooperation with NGOs in a number of spheres, such as
measuring corruption, legislative drafting of programmes, action plans, and other
normative acts, consultation with experts, etc.
In the case of the media, the situation is more complex. In contrast to NGOs, the
media are not that interested in long-term institutional and legislative measures. They
frame public discourse mostly through scandal and personalization of politics.
Therefore, personnel changes are indispensable in order to bridge the gap between
media and governmental discourse on corruption. For this purpose, governments
must involve elements of the prosecutors and the police, with the goal of starting
investigations of public persons, possibly including members of the governing
parties as well (only in exceptional cases, of course). It is important to stress that for
the purposes of collaboration with the media, governments need to focus only on the
start of investigations, since media interest is highest at this point, and goes down
dramatically at the more complex judicial stages, whose intricate procedures are
often impenetrable for the public in general
Even the opposition could be co-opted in terms of anticorruption discourse by a
skilful government. The key element here is the depoliticization of the issue through
the elaboration of a comprehensive anticorruption plan, which requires profound
long-term institutional changes in all areas of governance. Ultimately, governing
parties will be successful if they obtain the consent of the opposition for these
programmes and plans. It is normally not impossible, since these contain
predominantly common-sense measures aiming at the general improvement of
governance. And they reduce the chance of anti-corruption measures being
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selectively applied to leaders of the opposition. In certain cases, members of the
opposition could become also members of watchdog bodies, supervising the
implementation of legislative and institutional reforms.
Finally, the government must tread very carefully in its anticorruption discourse in
relation to the business sector. The best strategy to ensure its support is to lead a
policy of downsizing of the state and lowering the taxes. These are the key
anticorruption measures which the business community looks for. Normally, a
political crisis and instability are not in the interest of the economic players.
Anticorruption bodies instrumentalized by political players: a model
Although governments must admit the existence of corruption (even if not judicially
proven), in order to become players in the discourse battles, they have to do this
cautiously. It is impossible for key government politicians to speak regularly about
widespread corruption, to measure it, and to organise public awareness campaigns,
as this will associate the politicians with corruption in the eyes of the public.
Therefore, there is a political need for a semi-autonomous, semi-independent public
body to take upon itself the anticorruption discourse on behalf of the ruling parties.
Based on the previous discussion, one could conclude that it is rational for such a
body to have the following structure and powers:
First, its composition should build bridges with civil society and the opposition.
Members of civil society could either participate in the nominations of commis-
sioners, or even sit on the commission. At a minimum, most of the meetings of this
body should be open to the public and encourage media coverage and participation
of NGOs. As to the opposition, a delicate balance should be sought between its
participation and its support for long-term programmatic documents in the fight
against corruption;
The powers of these bodies need to be concentrated mainly in the area of
institutional reform, legislative drafting, and coordination among other government
agencies. Investigative powers are not needed, and indeed, they could antagonize
important groups as the police and the prosecutors. It could be the case, however,
that the commissions are entitled to initiate proceedings, which then are transferred
to the prosecutors and the police for continuation.
In relation to the media, the commission should be able to supply them with
media-friendly material. The best is the news of started proceedings and possible
indictments. In the absence of such data, the second-best option is statistical data on
the spread of corruption in society.
Finally, in relation to business, one could expect that the commission remains
discrete and appreciative of the two major factors of business support: downsizing of
the state and lowering of the taxes.
Applying the model: a brief case study
After presenting the rationale for the introduction of an anticorruption agency by a
government interested to use the anticorruption discourse for gaining political
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support, we can start explaining some of the peculiarities of the Eastern European
experience. Most importantly, it becomes apparent why the “preventive and
coordinative” model has proven much more popular than the Baltic multi-task
agency model. The answer is that the former fit much better the above-presented
rationale: they allow governments to use the mobilizational force of the corruption
discourse without great risks of finding themselves at the receiving end of
investigations and trials. To illustrate this thesis let us consider a brief case study
of the “preventive and coordinative model”.
At least four South East European countries follow closely the rationale discussed
in the previous section. These are Bulgaria (especially until 2008), Albania,
Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina. 7 In all of these countries, partly because
of domestic political dynamics, partly due to the pressure exercised by donors (like
the Council of Europe, EU, and others), a specific model of anticorruption
institutional reforms was adopted, which was aptly named by the EBRD “omnibus
programmes”: a coordinated assemblage of governmental structures and policies
specifically geared towards fighting corruption. The main elements of the omnibus
programmes were the following:
& an anti corruption law;
& a national anticorruption strategy or program;
& a ministerial commission, specialised unit or dedicated agency supervising
implementation;
& an action plan to implement the program; and
& a monitoring mechanism.
In Albania, by 2004 a Council of Europe’s project was underway, whose main
purpose was to strengthen a newly established anticorruption body: the so-called
Anticorruption Monitoring Group. In the same period, the Macedonian State
Commission against Corruption was set up (also with help of foreign donors).
Similar commissions were created in Bulgaria, in Bosnia and other countries as
well.
In Albania, the national anticorruption strategy and action plan were the product
of 2 years of dialogue between the donor community and the Albanian government,
resulting in a strategic document spanning five reform areas: public administration
reform, improved legislation, improvement of public finances management, better
transparency in business transactions, to public information and civil society
participation. The structure or agency overseeing the progress of the strategy
included an anticorruption monitoring group (ACMG)—composed of the legal
directors of relevant ministries as well as the Minister of State—to monitor the
implementation of the plan, give advice and issue recommendations, and suggest
improvement and prioritization of the plan. There was also a permanent secretariat to
the ACMG.
The Council of Europe’s approach in Albania was entirely focused on the
implementation of the action plan. The institutional structures that had been created
7 This part of my paper is based on [10]. For a more detailed analysis of the Albanian and Macedonian
anticorruption omnibus programmes please refer to From the Ground Up.
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had no responsibility or powers beyond ensuring the implementation of the plan.
More specifically, they lacked powers of investigation, indictment, etc.
In Macedonia, roughly at the same time, a State Commission for the Fight against
Corruption in Macedonia was set up with slightly more expanded prerogatives. Apart
from the adopting and monitoring of a national program for corruption prevention and
repression, it also had the power to summon—in secret if necessary—persons
suspected of corruption before the state commission to clarify their position before
possibly starting an initiative before the relevant bodies to discharge, replace or
criminally prosecute those suspected elected officials or public servants suspected of
corruption.
If we adopt the view of the anticorruption commissions as instruments for the
governing parties to mobilise support through the corruption discourse, the structure
and the powers of these bodies become much more understandable. Their main
purpose was to build what could be called “discourse coalitions” with civil society,
the media, and other influential actors. From this perspective, the bodies were quite
functional:
First, they managed to gain support of umbrella civil society anticorruption
organisations, which comprised NGOs from all possible corners of civil society.
Thus, the issue of the fight against corruption was practically depoliticised.8
The fight against corruption was successfully shifted from the issue of political and
personnel changes to institutional and legislative reforms. From a discourse perspective
no one could seriously challenge the governments that they were not “taking measures”
against corruption, or not “recognizing” the seriousness of the problem. All in all, the
governments had become players in the corruption discourse, competing with the
opposition and others over anticorruption as a precious resource of political mobilisation.
The South East European commission enjoyed good relations with the media as
well. Parts of the activities initiated or sponsored by these bodies and its supportive
civil society organizations were actually televized, and were quite popular. Hot line
telephone lines were set up, TV shows were raising public awareness, etc. In all of
these, paradoxically, the governments were not always at the receiving end of public
criticism, but also got an opportunity to publicise its own efforts in the
implementation of the action plans, etc
Conclusions
Towards the end of the 1990s Eastern Europe embarked on an institutional
experiment involving a considerable leap of faith: the universal implementation of
anticorruption institutional reforms. An important part of these was the setting up of
new bodies designed to create and carry out anticorruption policies and strategies.
As shown, at the start, these bodies were generally not empowered with investigative
8 The best example of anticorruption programmes backed by similar umbrella civil society organisations
comes from Bulgaria, where, again with the help of USAID, the Coalition 2000 was created. This body
spearheaded a number of anticorruption reforms and generally helped successive governments in the
creation of their anticorruption strategies. It has to be stressed that it also adopted a non-confrontational
stance vis-à-vis governments of the day, and aimed to secure their cooperation
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powers but were involved in building partnerships with civil society groups, and
prepared comprehensive anti-corruption strategies, action plans, etc (the “preventive
and coordinative” model). These commissions were an essential element of a
specific approach to the fight against corruption dubbed by the European Bank for
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) “omnibus programmes” [9].
Initially, these bodies had a positive overall effect in raising public awareness
concerning the issue of corruption. Gradually, however, publics seemed to grow tired
of this type of activity. Probably, there is a point of saturation at which public
awareness of the spread of corruption turns into cynicism regarding anticorruption
activities as a whole. If this point is reached, which might well be the case in some
countries of the region [10], an important unintended consequence appears. This is
the falling confidence in the political establishment, the rise of populist leaders and
parties, and the growing general discontent with the constitutional order and liberal
democracy.9
The increasing public and external pressure for more tangible results in the fight
against corruption has led to a second phase of the anti-corruption institutional leap
of faith in Eastern Europe. The Baltic countries, as well as several states in the South
East corner of the region have created specific investigative and prosecutorial
agencies to tackle the problem of corruption. Romania has set up a National
Anticorruption Directorate, and Bulgaria (rather more cautiously) is following suit
with its SANS.
When we compare the anticorruption leap of faith to other similar cases of
institutional engineering—for instance, the democratic and the constitutional ones
which took place in the beginning of the 1990s—there is one substantial and obvious
difference. While in the first two cases Eastern European reformers relied heavily on
copying the established democracies of the Western world, in the third case there
were very few such authoritative precedents. Exactly because of this conspicuous
lack of precedent, rare and rather exceptional institutional solutions, such as the anti-
corruption commissions of Hong Kong and New South Wales, gained dispropor-
tionate prominence in policy debates and discussions.10
If Western experience did not offer a model, other justifications and motivations
for the anti-corruption institutional leap should be explored. This paper argued that
the reason explaining the massive introduction of anticorruption bodies is not a
strong belief in their performance, a strong belief in the results they produce. On the
contrary, most of the observers are generally unhappy with the results of
anticorruption activities in Eastern Europe. Further, the “performance” issue is
complicated by the absence of shared standards and indicators: against this
background, there is a flourishing market for “quasi-indicators”, “benchmarks”,
9 For the recent rise of populist politics in Eastern Europe see the discussion [5].
10 The author of this article himself has participated in a number of conferences, seminars and workshops
at which experts and politicians from throughout Eastern Europe and Central Asia were discussing the
experience of the Hong Kong and New South Wales anticorruption commissions. It is also telling that in
the most authoritative handbook on corruption of the early 1990s Arnold Heidenheimer, Michael
Johnston, and Victor LeVine (eds.), Political Corruption, Transaction Publishers (1989) there is only one
article on an anticorruption agency, again from an exotic country and hardly an established democracy—
Singapore: Jon S. T. Quah, “Singapore’s Experience in Curbing Corruption”, p. 841.
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and “best practices”, a typical feature of which is the presentation of local, context-
dependent arguments in support of universal conclusions.
Eastern Europeans have been long trained in the Hegelian doctrine of identity of
reason and reality, according to which there should be a sound rational justification
for everything that is real, anti-corruption institutions included. In this vein, in this
paper it was argued that local politicians and policy-makers needed these institutions
as tools of leverage over the anticorruption discourse, which has become one of the
most important instruments of political mobilisation. Admittedly, it is a complex
argument which could hardly be substantiated in a short article.
Presenting the anticorruption commissions and agencies as (discourse-controlling)
instruments is not meant to be a conclusive argument against their introduction.
There is no doubt that in certain circumstances they could produce positive results,
which go beyond discourse per se. Looking at them as discourse tools, however,
gives an answer to the troubling question why governing parties are at all interested
in the introduction of such bodies. The answer suggested here is that these bodies
help governments use anticorruption discourse in electoral context in their own
favour. Anticorruption, which typically is a topic on which the political opposition
thrives, becomes useful for the incumbent who could offer strategies and plans,
organise public awareness campaigns, establish links with NGOs, and even initiate
corruption proceedings against high profile figures. These possibilities level the
playing field between government and opposition in electoral contexts.
As said, apart from instrumentalization in political discourse, anticorruption
bodies in Eastern Europe have had other effects as well. At best, as shown in the
Baltic case, institutional engineering provides for a brief window of opportunity
during which political forces really committed to integrity could gain the upper
hand. The problem in Eastern Europe, however, is not the lack of such windows of
opportunities—it is more the lack of really committed political forces. What we have
now in many countries in the region are troubled party systems, disintegrated
mainstream political parties, rising populist and opportunist players. What is
urgently needed in Eastern Europe is a revival of the representative structures of
democracy: the strengthening of responsible parties, public media, pressure groups,
trade unions, etc. If this is not the case, public frustration with the political elites will
continue to increase, and it will continue to be vented in terms of corruption
allegations. I am afraid that no anticorruption agency would be able to tackle these
problems meaningfully, and the public will start to see these bodies primarily as
expressions of political hypocrisy.
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